Reported By Lee, Chen-Li（Daniel）李振麟
Public procurement data in Vietnam shows that Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE have won several 5G equipment contracts this year. As U.S.–Vietnam relations cool due to tariff disputes and Vietnam strengthens ties with China, Hanoi appears to be shifting from a stance of “cautious distance” to “partial openness” toward Chinese tech involvement in critical infrastructure—an adjustment that has drawn significant attention from Western governments.
According to Vietnam’s bidding platform and people familiar with the matter, a consortium involving Huawei secured a US$23 million 5G equipment contract in April. ZTE, meanwhile, won multiple 5G antenna contracts worth over US$20 million, mainly from state-owned telecom operators.
Despite these wins, the core layer of Vietnam’s 5G network remains dominated by Western suppliers such as Ericsson, Nokia, and U.S. semiconductor giant Qualcomm. Vietnam is now operating under a hybrid model—Western suppliers for the core, while Chinese vendors are gradually gaining access to the radio and peripheral layers.
For years, concerns raised by the U.S. and Europe led Vietnam to adopt a conservative approach toward Chinese telecom equipment, especially in submarine cables, backbone networks, and other sensitive telecommunications nodes, where Huawei and ZTE were largely excluded.
However, the recent wave of U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese exports has strained bilateral trade and prompted policy adjustments in Hanoi. On one hand, Vietnam has strengthened cooperation with Beijing in areas such as cross-border railways and border economic cooperation zones.
On the other hand, it has slightly relaxed restrictions on Chinese suppliers in next-generation telecom infrastructure, particularly 5G, in exchange for more competitive pricing and financing options, effectively loosening supply-chain constraints with China.
Diplomats interpret this as Vietnam attempting to broaden its strategic maneuvering room amid intensifying U.S.–China technological rivalry.
Western governments now worry that Southeast Asia’s dependence on Chinese telecom infrastructure could deepen further. Huawei and ZTE have long been designated by Washington as high-risk entities and are fully banned from U.S. telecommunications networks. European nations also impose strict admission and replacement rules for Chinese network equipment.
In this context, Vietnam’s gradual expansion of Chinese 5G equipment adoption has prompted private warnings from multiple U.S. and European officials. They fear that efforts to build a “non-Chinese 5G ecosystem” in the Indo-Pacific may weaken, shrinking future leverage in negotiations over cybersecurity standards, telecom protocols, and regulatory frameworks.
Some Western security officials have warned that a substantial increase in Chinese-brand equipment in Vietnam’s radio access and end-device layers would significantly raise the cost and complexity of building secure telecommunications networks across the Indo-Pacific.
Vietnam is a critical manufacturing base for multinational companies including Apple, Samsung Electronics, and Nike. The country relies heavily on Chinese components and intermediate goods, while simultaneously depending on U.S. and European markets for final consumption.
In this dual-dependency structure, Vietnam’s growing inclination toward Chinese 5G solutions is viewed as an attempt to expand its policy flexibility amid global supply-chain restructuring and U.S.–China competition.
Analysts note that how regional economies choose between core network suppliers and peripheral network vendors will increasingly influence multinational companies’ decisions on production allocation, technology partnerships, and long-term investment strategies.